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Abstract—Enabling blockchain technology into IoT can help
to achieve a proper distributed consensus based IoT system that
overcomes disadvantages of today’s centralized infrastructures,
such as, among others, high cloud server maintenance costs,
weakness for supporting time-critical IoT applications, security
and trust issues. However, meeting requirements posed by IoT
in blockchain domain is not an easy endeavour. [1] proposes
Hybrid-IoT, as a step towards decentralizing IoT with the help
of blockchain technology. Hybrid-IoT consists of multiple PoW
sub-blockchains to achieve distributed consensus among IoT
devices and an inter-connector framework, to execute transactions
between sub-blockchains. In this paper, we take the first step
towards designing an inter-connector for multiple blockchains for
IoT that is specifically tailored for the Hybrid-IoT architecture.
We also provide a detailed security discussion, in order to identify
threats and we provide discussion on how to cope with threats.
,
Index Terms—IoT, blockchain, interoperability, distributed
systems, architecture, security
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1982, a group of graduate students at Carnegie Mellon
University’s computer science department decided to try to
connect their building’s sodas machine to the Internet. Since
the the machine was very frequently empty, the students
wanted to find a way to remotely check the supply and temper-
ature of sodas, without walking all the way there1. According
to many and different sources, this is considered the very first
example of an Internet of Things (IoT) device. Today, IoT
technology is applied to several environments (e.g. buildings,
automotive etc.), with the goal to make them smarter, more
connected, profitable, inter-operable and efficient.
Today, most of the IoT platforms are centralized cloud based
computing infrastructures. However, their centralized nature
presents a number of drawbacks to IoT, such as; high cloud
server maintenance costs; weak adoption and support for time-
critical IoT applications; security issues (e.g., Single Point
of Failure (SPoF)). On the other hand, decentralization, if
achieved, would have the advantage to reduce the amount of
data that are transferred to the cloud for processing and anal-
ysis, it would be instrumental to improve security and privacy
of the managed data [2], [3], and it would lead to concerted
and autonomous operations. Decentralized IoT systems have
to be able to process high throughput of transactions and scale
to many peers in achieving consensus without a trusted central
authority. Therefore, IoT decentralization requires frameworks
1ibm.com/blogs/industries/little-known-story-first-iot-device
that employ scalable and performant distributed consensus
among peers. Lack of such frameworks has been a bottleneck
against successful decentralization of many domains including
IoT. A promising decentralized platform for IoT is blockchain,
since it opened a way to overcome distributed consensus bot-
tlenecks in a decentralized setting for large scale applications
(cfr. Section II for background information on blockchain).
Hybrid-IoT. Within the blockchain context and approach,
Hybrid-IoT is an ecosystem for IoT decentralization, and it
presents a hybrid blockchain architecture that is tailored for
IoT, as presented in [1]. Hybrid-IoT consists of multiple PoW
sub-blockchains to achieve distributed consensus among IoT
devices and an inter-connector framework, to execute transac-
tions between sub-blockchains. Hybrid-IoT design enables IoT
devices to operate and collaborate autonomously by by-passing
performance and scalability bottlenecks in a decentralized
setting. This opens a way to design autonomous and smart
IoT systems that, unlike today’s IoT systems, doesn’t need
any centralized party to perform their tasks.
Inter-connector framework. In this work, we present
the design of multiple blockchain inter-connector that is
specifically tailored for the Hybrid-IoT ecosystem. While the
overall Hybrid-IoT idea was introduced in [1], that work
focused on the design and implementation of sub-blockchains,
announcing the design of the inter-connector framework as
future work. Proposed inter-connector framework connects
many-sub-blockchains as a relay system and its objectives
and characteristics are: execute transactions among the sub-
blockchains; guarantee transactions execution, security and
accountability; not exercise any direct control over any of the
sub-blockchain’s consensus mechanism; connect to the sub-
blockchains and monitor their execution, and diagnose mal-
functioning sub-blockchains. Proposed design for the multiple
blockchain inter-connector consists of three main modules,
namely: a consensus module (see Section IV-A), a finality
module (see Section IV-C) and a relay mechanism (see Section
IV-B). The consensus module consists of an embedded con-
sensus mechanism that executes set of processes (i.e. transac-
tions of sub-blockchains). The finality module computes the
transaction acceptance times of inter-chain transactions, which
corresponds to the amount of time that needs to pass, while
such transactions held by the Hybrid-IoT inter-connector, for
inter-chain transactions to be considered as irreversible in their
source sub-blockchain. This is due to the fact that block final-
ity is probabilistic in PoW protocol used by sub-blockchains,
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and the Hybrid-IoT inter-connector adjusts and uses various
mathematical models and algorithms and also takes target
security levels between co-operating sub-blockchains, referred
to as collaboration policies. The Relay mechanism performs
two main tasks: it transfers inter-chain transactions between
sub-blockchains to the consensus module for processing; it
connects to the to finality module in order to fetch transaction
acceptance times for inter-chain transactions; and, it connects
to the consensus module to watch for new transactions and
transfer them to their destined sub-blockchains.
Structure. The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. In Section II, we provide background information on
blockchains. We review the literature in Section III We detail
the design of Hybrid-IoT inter-connector in Section IV. In
Section V, we discuss the security of the proposed design of
the multiple blockchain inter-connector. Section VI concludes
the paper.
II. BACKGROUND ON BLOCKCHAINS
Blockchain relies on the concept of a distributed ledger
maintained by a peer-to-peer network [4]. Novelty of the
blockchain technology lies in its ability to achieve coordination
and verification of individual activities carried out by different
parties without a centralized authority or trusted third party,
that allows decentralization of application execution with con-
certed and autonomous operations. Blockchain data structure
consists of bundled data chunks called blocks, where peers
in a blockchain broadcast blocks by exploiting public-key
cryptography. Blocks are recorded in the blockchain with exact
ordering. A block contains: a set of transactions; a timestamp;
a reference to the preceding block that identifies the block’s
place in the blockchain; an authenticated data structure (e.g.,
a Merkle tree) to ensure block integrity.2
Since blockchains are distributed systems, peers of a block-
chain network coordinate and co-operate using consensus
protocols, such as Proof of Work (PoW), or BFT (Byzantine
Fault Tolerant) protocols. PoW consensus mechanisms rely on
the condition of doing some computation to prove legitimacy
of the performed operation. On the other hand, BFT protocols
depend on state replication between block generators on the
processed transactions, in order to be able to operate correctly
and achieve consensus in existence of malicious and arbitrarily
behaving block generators. Proof of Stake (PoS) consensus
algorithms are popular with the blockchain protocols as well,
which can be grouped under the BFT algorithms. In PoS,
where next generator of the block is selected via combinations
of either random selection with their stake (i.e. either their
wealth, or age). algorithms
III. RELATED WORK
In this section, we provide an overview of the prominent
proposals, like the inter-chain connector framework, that aims
to connect multiple blockchains not only for IoT, please
refer to [5] for detailed discussion. Polkadot ecosystem [6]
2Block structure varies in different blockchain protocols, here we list the
most common elements.
is a multi-chain framework that aims to bring interoperability
among multiple blockchains. It consists of two types of com-
ponents: parachains are blockchains that are tailored according
to their tasks and use-cases to computations and operations,
and, the relay chain is the central chain in the Polkadot ecosys-
tem that performs transactions among parachains. Polkadot
follows a hybrid consensus strategy and splits up block pro-
duction and finality gadget3. Moreover, relay chain aims to
provide shared security and trust free transactions between
parachains. This requires parachain transactions to be validated
by relay chain, which in turn limits flexibility in designing and
building parachains. Another example is Cosmos [7], which
is a blockchain network architecture, similar to the Hybrid-
IoT inter-connector and Polkadot that encompasses multiple
blockchains, called zones, and provide inter-operability among
them through inter-connector called Cosmos Hub. The Cosmos
is based on Tendermint [8] PBFT consensus algorithm. It
separates states of cosmos hub and zones (i.e. cosmos hub
and zones as in [7]), and aims to establish a heterogeneous
network of Proof of Stake (PoS) zones. Interledger [9] is
a protocol for secure transfers across payment systems. It
aims to allow atomic transfer value among any two parties
by providing a cryptographically signed receipt from receiver
to the sender to not to incur any risks. Interledger protocol
achieves atomicity of transaction execution by using an adop-
tion Two-Phase commit protocol [10] to the financial model as
a transaction commit protocol. However, Interledger’s model
requires additional communication between involved parties
and notaries that act as transactions managers in the two-phase
commit protocol and demands additional resources for execut-
ing cryptographic operations. Which, considering high volume
of transactions to process, is costly for resource constrained
IoT devices, unlike the inter-connector design presented in this
paper. [11] presents a decentralized construction for trustless
communication between PoW blockchains, as a way to allow
passing of different information between blockchains, not only
assets. Similar to the Hybrid-IoT inter-connector, it presents
a way to connect PoW blockchains. Unlike the multiple
blockchain inter-connector protocol presented in this paper,
it requires PoW blockchains to have cryptographic primitive
NIPoPoWs [12].
IV. BLOCKCHAIN INTER-CONNECTOR DESIGN
Introducing multiple blockchains in an IoT ecosystem re-
quires to generate a collaboration and co-operation infrastruc-
ture for transactions processed in different blockchains.
Design approach. There are different approaches for de-
signing an inter-connector system. For example, Polkadot
consists and progresses a global state of inter-connector and
sub-blockchains (i.e. relay chain and parachains as in [6]).
Therefore, the inter-connector validates the states of sub-
blockchains, and it is responsible for their correct execution
and sub-blockchains benefit from shared security provided by
the whole Polkadot ecosystem. On the other hand, Cosmos
3https://wiki.polkadot.network/en/latest/polkadot/learn/consensus/
[7] separates states of inter-connector and sub-blockchains
(i.e. cosmos hub and zones as in [7]), and aims to connect
independent blockchains, referred to as chain sovereignty.
Another approach may be leaving blockchains independent
from the rest of the system while employing their consensus
mechanisms with their own metrics.In this approach, neither
blockchain inter-connector framework nor other blockchains
have control over one blockchain’s consensus mechanism. For
this approach, blockchain inter-connector must be connected
to the blockchains and monitors their execution in order to
diagnose blockchains that are malfunctioning (i.e. failing to
function properly as defined by the protocol), either because
they are under attack (e.g. double spend attack [13]), or there
is a network congestion (e.g. high stale rates, long block
generation intervals etc.).
For Hybrid-IoT ecosystem, we consider the last design
approach as the most suitable one, since it is more flexible
to be applied in various use cases and thus it is more
feasible to adopt to IoT domain. Therefore, for the rest of this
section, we focus on this approach and provide an overview of
modules required to realize this design approach and tailor it
according to the needs of the Hybrid-IoT ecosystem. Designed
multiple blockchain inter-connector consist of at least three
main elements, namely; consensus module (see Section IV-A),
finality module (see Section IV-C) and relay mechanism (see
Section IV-B).
A. Consensus module
As a distributed system, multiple blockchain inter-connector
framework executes set of processes (i.e. executing transac-
tions of blockchains) through a consensus mechanism that
is embedded in the consensus module. Multiple blockchain
inter-connector framework consists of different machines (i.e.
servers) to process and transmit transactions between sub-
blockchains. Consensus module’s task is to regulate inter-
connector execution and it consists of a consensus mechanism
(i.e. implementation of a consensus algorithm). Consensus
mechanism can employ various kinds of consensus algorithms,
with various levels of fault tolerance guarantees, such as Crash
Fault Tolerant (CFT) algorithms like Raft [14], or Byzantine
Fault Tolerant algorithms such as [8], [15]. The choice of
algorithm should be based on assumption on the network and
participants, and their threat model. Consensus module should
be designed as an independent module that can be plugged to
the multiple blockchain inter-connector. This is due to the fact
that operation of the inter-connector framework (e.g. such as
how to connect to blockchains, how to transfer transactions)
has to be independent from the type of consensus mechanism
used by the consensus module.
B. Relay Mechanism
The relay mechanism have at least three roles: first, listening
sub-blockchains to check new blocks, and transfer transactions
between sub-blockchains to the consensus module; second,
connecting to the finality module to send network and con-
sensus level statistics and fetching transaction finality times;
and third connecting to the consensus module to watch for
new recorded transactions to transfer them to their target
sub-blockchains. In order to watch sub-blockchains and the
consensus module, the relay mechanism must include set
of dedicated parties, referred to as relay nodes, to perform
transaction transmission among relay mechanism and peers of
blockchains. Each sub-blockchain has at least one dedicated
relay node(s), to transfer it’s transactions targeted for another
sub-blockchain and receive transactions sent from other sub-
blockchains. Having more than one relay node dedicated
to a sub-blockchain increases fault tolerance of the system,
since if one node gets faulty, inter-chain transactions can
be still performed using another relay node. The connection
between relay nodes and finality module is twofold: first,
relay nodes periodically send network and consensus level
statistics to finality module; and second, relay nodes fetch
transaction acceptance period for inter-chain transactions from
finality time table in finality module. A dedicated relay node
performs its roles by running different processes in parallel,
which are: connecting to sub-blockchains to fetch inter-chain
transactions and monitoring network activities; sending latest
network statistics to finality module and fetching finality time
table; storing inter-chain transactions in the ledger of the
consensus module, that are fetched from their dedicated sub-
blockchain; and, watching ledger of the consensus module for
newly written inter-chain transactions sent from other sub-
blockchains to it’s dedicated sub-blockchain.
C. Finality Module
When blockchains employ the PoW consensus paradigm,
in which block finality is probabilistic, and thus transactions
inside the newly mined block can be reverted by generation of
conflicting blocks. This means, at any point of time, another
block can be proposed by the network, and if the protocol
specific conditions hold (e.g. the new block extends the length
of the blockchain and it’s timestamp is in the correct timestamp
range range like Nakamoto Consensus for Bitcoin4), the new
block can be added and the older block can be pruned from the
blockchain. However, the possibility of a block being pruned
decreases gradually with more blocks connected to it in a chain
structure, since they are considered as confirmations. As such,
in Bitcoin [16], after six confirmations a block is considered
as final (i.e. it is impractical for that block to be removed
from the blockchain). Literature offers interesting approaches
that deal with the mathematical modeling of the blockchain
protocols with different assumptions on the synchronicity,
attacker policy etc., such as [17]–[20].
The finality module’s task is to calculate block finality5
time with up to date parameters fetched from the relay
mechanism. In the inter-connector framework, block finality
time translates to the amount of time that should elapse before
processing inter-chain transactions inside the block, referred
to as transaction acceptance period. Similar to the consensus
4en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Blocktimestamp
5Here finality refers to very high probability, due to the impossibility of
finality in Nakamoto Consensus.
module, finality module is plugged to the inter-connector, and
therefore it is flexible to employ any mathematical model to
calculate transaction acceptance period.
The finality module introduces the concept of collaboration
policies, which are used to model target security level of
the inter-chain transaction execution between any two sub-
blockchains. As such, depending on the application scenario,
parties in two sub-blockchains may trust each other more than
others, and thus they might demand low security level from the
finality module which translates to having shorter transaction
acceptance periods between those sub-blockchains. On the
contrary, other sub-blockchains may have a collaboration pol-
icy that demands a high level security, which in turn requires
more confirmations and longer transaction acceptance period.
Collaboration policies between any two sub-blockchains are
introduced to the finality module when they join to the Hybrid-
IoT ecosystem. The finality module periodically calculates
block finality time with up to date input parameters and
collaboration policies between sub-blockchains, then, updates
and stores them in the finality time table. Relay mechanism
uses finality time table to regulate waiting time for transaction
execution between sub-blockchains.
Finality module adjusts and uses various mathematical
models and algorithms. As the initial model, we envision
to adjust and use the model presented in [17], which offers
three different robustness notions that correspond to different
security guarantees, one of which will be adopted by the
finality module to calculate waiting time to execute inter-chain
transactions with given collaboration policies. Therefore, the
input parameters of the finality module are: mining power
percentage of the devices that are trying to alter the consensus
protocol, i.e. attackers6, and block generation intervals, both
fetched from relay nodes; and collaboration policies as target
security levels of the inter-chain transaction executions.
V. SECURITY DISCUSSION
Security vulnerabilities, if not properly addressed and pre-
vented, may allow adversaries to damage correct execution
of IoT systems and the proposed multiple blockchain inter-
connector. As described in Section IV, the inter-connector
takes counter-measures against some of the attacks that
might affect sub-blockchains. Such attacks can be grouped
as network-level attacks and consensus attacks. Network-
level attacks include: eclipse attacks [21], network deadlocks,
and, Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) [22] attacks.
Consensus-level attacks include: double-spend attacks [13];
selfish mining attacks [23]; and, 50%+ mining power attacks7.
In the following we discuss the counter-measures will be taken
by the inter-connector against those attacks.
Proposed relay nodes have direct connections to all miner
IoT devices in the blockchains. This assumption enables relay
nodes to have the consensus and network level control by
6Here, we presume the worst case, that is all devices that are malfunc-
tioning are collaborating to cheat the system so they are attackers, rather than
acting individually, to maximize their success probability.
7en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Majorityattack
preventing various attack vectors. As such, first, dedicated
relay nodes detect the IoT devices who has not been respond-
ing back to its’ connection messages, labels that device as
a malfunctioning device. Dedicated relay nodes monitor sub-
blockchains to calculate network and consensus level statistics,
such as; average block generation interval, network diameter,
block and transaction traverse times, and network latency.
Thanks to that, relay nodes have the overall view of the
network and can detect malfunctioning devices and network
connections that cause network deadlocks and connection
problems, and can suggest alternative routes and connections
to the devices. Moreover, dedicated relay nodes can detect
eclipse attacks [21] by monitoring IoT devices, and detecting
the ones that are not getting any new transactions or blocks
that have been published by others, thus targeted by an
eclipse attack. Dedicated relay nodes can also detect devices
that are part of a malicious botnet and performing DDoS
attacks, by examining the devices generating extensive amount
of network traffic (i.e. through transactions and blocks) and
overall network traffic. In order to prevent 50+% attack (also
known as majority attack), relay nodes take a conservative
approach and consider all malfunctioning and not-responding
devices as attackers, and treats them as a single adversary. In
case of substantial increase in the number of such devices
and their percentage of mining power reaches pre-defined
thresholds, depending on the application scenario and security
metrics ( e.g. when selfish mining attack [23] is a relevant
scenario, than threshold is set to 33%), relay nodes stop
transferring inter-chain transactions from that sub-blockchain.
Additionally, relay nodes are able to identify selfish mining
and associated attacks (e.g. stubborn mining [24]), since
block and transaction sharing and transmission happens in
between members of a closely connected group in the network,
dedicated relay nodes extract communication patterns to detect
the selfish mining groups. Upon detecting malfunctioning and
attacker devices, dedicated relay nodes notify all devices in
respective sub-blockchain to reject connections and network
packets sent by those devices. them, and rejects all transactions
sent by those.
We would like to note that, by using a BFT consensus
module and by making the consensus module able to check
claims of different dedicated relay nodes of a sub-blockchain,
we can remove the trust relation in between sub-blockchains
to their dedicated relay nodes. This would allow system to be
more flexible to the joining and leaving of relay nodes and
will have higher level of fault tolerance (i.e. BFT).
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented a novel design of the multiple
blockchain inter-connector for IoT that is tailored for the
Hybrid-IoT ecosystem. It consists of three modules in order to
achieve co-operation among multiple blockchains: consensus
module, relay mechanism and finality module. We also provide
a detailed security discussion on the proposed design on what
are the threats and how they can be addressed.
As future work, first, we plan to define execution algorithm
of the relay mechanism and test its performance with perfor-
mance experiments. increase number of experiments we run
to test Hybrid-IoT inter-connector’s performance. Second, we
plan to prove correctness of the Hybrid-IoT inter-connector
and overall Hybrid-IoT system execution with security proofs.
Finally, we plan to increase resilience of the Hybrid-IoT
ecosystem against malicious botnets8 by adding botnet detec-
tion mechanisms such as [26], [27]).
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